7The Child's Right to an Open Future
Joel Feinberg argued that children hold rights in trust to options they will value as adults. Both implant advocates and Deaf advocates claim this argument, and the most defensible reading keeps two doors open at once.
FWhat Feinberg actually argued
The philosopher Joel Feinberg proposed that children possess a distinct class of entitlements he called rights-in-trust: interests that the child cannot yet exercise but that adults must protect so the future adult can exercise them. Foremost among these is an interest in an open future, meaning that decisions made for a child should preserve, rather than prematurely close off, the range of life paths that the grown person might reasonably want to pursue. A parent who irreversibly forecloses a major option is, on this view, spending a choice that was not theirs to spend.
Feinberg’s argument was never written about deafness; it is a general principle about how much a guardian may shape an irreversible feature of a child’s life. That generality is exactly why it has become the central vocabulary of the pediatric cochlear implant debate. Almost every party agrees that a child’s future autonomy matters. They disagree sharply about which decision keeps that future most open.[1980][1997]
THow Davis extended it to the deaf child
Bioethicist Dena Davis applied Feinberg’s framework directly to deaf children in the context of parents who might deliberately seek a deaf child or decline interventions such as implantation. Davis framed the tension not as beneficence versus autonomy but as the parents’ present autonomy against the child’s future autonomy, and she argued that choices which sharply narrow the child’s adult options deserve special scrutiny.
The difficulty is that the open-future test does not, by itself, deliver a verdict here, because both candidate futures are rich rather than impoverished. A confident signing member of the Deaf community has a full life; so does a person who hears and speaks. The argument only bites when a decision is plausibly foreclosing one of those futures rather than enabling it, which moves the analysis away from abstract autonomy and toward concrete questions of language access and reversibility.[1997][2010]
CBoth sides claim the same principle
Implant advocates read the open future as a case for early implantation: spoken language is the gateway to the surrounding hearing society, to most schools, workplaces and institutions, and a child who never develops it may find many adult paths effectively closed. On this reading, declining an implant during the sensitive period spends the child’s spoken-language option.
Deaf advocates read the same principle in the opposite direction. They point out that withholding a natural sign language and distancing a child from the Deaf community can foreclose a coherent linguistic and cultural identity, and that a signing future is not a deficit to be corrected but an option in its own right. Stripped to its core, the disagreement is less about the value of autonomy than about which doors a given decision opens and which it quietly shuts.[1997][2010]
CThe strongest reading: keep both doors open
Because the two futures are both worthwhile and because early childhood is a one-time window, the reading that best honors Feinberg’s logic is not to choose one door but to keep both ajar for as long as developmentally possible. In practice this means a cochlear implant pursued together with early, fluent access to a sign language, so that the growing child is built toward spoken competence without being cut off from the visual language and community they may later embrace.
This is a both-and rather than either-or interpretation, and it has a clear asymmetry in its favor: providing early access to two language modalities is largely reversible in its consequences, whereas a missed sensitive period for any first language is not. Keeping the future open is therefore less a slogan than an instruction to avoid irreversible single-track bets while the child cannot yet voice a preference.[2010][2016]
Which statement most accurately reflects how the open-future argument applies here?
What did Feinberg mean by a child's 'rights-in-trust'?
How did Dena Davis reframe the central tension for the deaf child?
Why does the open-future argument fail to settle the implant debate on its own?
What asymmetry favors the both-and (implant plus early sign) reading?
How do implant advocates typically apply the open-future argument?